Gulf of Tonkin, 1964 :: WhiteHouseTapes.org
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The Gulf of Tonkin, 1964
Perspectives from the Lyndon Johnson and National Military Command Center Tapes
by Marc Selverstone and David Coleman
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In August 1964 , Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution—or Southeast Asia Resolution, as it is officially known—the congressional decree that gave Johnson a broad mandate to wage war in Vietnam. Its passage was a pivotal moment in the war and arguably the tipping point for the disaster that followed. The Resolution, passed by Congress on August 7, 1964, and signed into law on August 10, capped a series of events which remain controversial.
On the night of August 4, 1964, two American destroyers, the U.S.S. Maddox and C. Turner Joy, reported that they were being attacked by North Vietnamese military units in the Gulf of Tonkin, the body of water off the coast of central and North Vietnam. These alleged incidents followed reports of a similar engagement two days earlier, on August 2, between North Vietnamese PT boats and the Maddox. Characterizing these attacks as “unprovoked,” President Johnson ordered retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam and asked Congress to sanction any further action he might take to deter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Believing the administration’s account of these events, legislators acted swiftly, giving Johnson a virtual “blank check” to use U.S. military force in Vietnam.
As frustratingly incomplete and often contradictory reports flowed into Washington, several high-ranking military and civilian officials were suspicious of the August 4 incident of questioned from the beginning whether the attack was real or imagined. By the time that Johnson signed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on August 10, several senior officials—and probably the president himself—had concluded that the attack of August 4 was imagined.
Below are selected clips related to the Gulf of Tonkin affair. The full collection of LBJ tapes that have been released by the LBJ Library, along with detailed information about the LBJ tapes and other research materials, are available for download here.
Click on the dates at left to open LBJ's presidential daily diary for that day. |
| August 3, 1964 |
As news of an attack by a North Vietnamese PT boat on the Maddox reached Washington, administration officials publicly characterized the incident as unprovoked aggression. Privately, however, President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara conceded that U.S. covert operations in the Gulf of Tonkin had probably provoked the North Vietnamese attack.
Facing pressure on the right for a large scale military response and from the left for disengagement, and not wanting to be forced down either path, Johnson used information to influence the political debate. To the most vocal critics on the right calling for a forceful retaliation, Johnson and his senior advisers quietly sent word that U.S. covert operations in the region had probably provoked the North Vietnamese attacks. In public, however, the administration vehemently denied such claims and went to considerable lengths to discredit them, maintaining the official line that the attacks were unprovoked.
" . . . these covert operations. There's no question but that had some bearing on it."
To Robert McNamara
[Extract from Tape WH6408.03 PNO 10, Citation #4633]
"So I imagine they wanted to put a stop to it."
To Robert Anderson
[Extract from Tape WH6408.03 PNO 9, Citation #4632]
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| August 4, 1964 |
As real-time information flowed in to the Pentagon from the Maddox and the Turner Joy, the story became more and more confused.
Admiral U.S. Grant "Oley" Sharp, commander of the Pacific Fleet, fed reports to Washington as soon as he received them. In this phone call, Sharp briefed Air Force General David Burchinal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the latest information he was receiving.
This telephone call was recorded at the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon. It was amongst a series of recordings released by the LBJ Library in June 2002.
". . . there apparently have been at least nine torpedoes in the water. . . . All missed, and apparently two of their boats have been sunk, as far as we can tell."
12:22 p.m., Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp to General David Burchinal
[Extract from NMCC Tape VN01_10]
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| August 6 , 1964 |
Having spent the morning on the Hill testifying to Congressional committees, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara updated President Johnson on Congressional support for the Tonkin Resolution. Despite a few dissenting voices on both sides of the aisle, McNamara reported that Congressional support for the Resolution was strong.
" . . . a blank check authorization for further action . . . "
12:46 p.m., To Robert McNamara
[Extract from Tape WH6408.08 PNO 22, Citation #4773]
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Election-year politics complicated the administration's response. While criticism from the likes of Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater was expected, Johnson was forced to contend with a renegade voice much closer to the White House.
While President Johnson, Robert McNamara, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk were all trying to convince Congress and the American public that the North Vietnamese attacks were unprovoked, Johnson's running mate in the upcoming presidential election, Hubert Humphrey, broke with the administration line and revealed the classified, covert role that the U.S. Navy had been playing to support South Vietnamese sabotage raids against North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin.
" . . . our friend Hubert [Humphrey] is just destroying himself with his big mouth. "
To James Rowe
[Extract from Tape WH6408.09 PNO 4, Citation #4777]
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Recommended Reading:
- Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999)
- Edwin E. Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996)
- Robert Mann, A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam (New York: Basic Books, 2001)
- Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995)
- David Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War (Cambridge: Belknap, 2000)
Further
Resources:
- Transcription: Seth Center, Kerry O'Brien, David Coleman, Kent Germany, Marc Selverstone, and Robert Johnson
- Text & Editing: David Coleman and Marc Selverstone
- Research Assistance: Kerry O'Brien
- Editorial Advisers: Kent Germany and Timothy Naftali
- Web & Multimedia Design: David Coleman
- Digital Archivist: Michael Greco
- Hosted by WhiteHouseTapes.org
- Presidential Recordings Program (Timothy Naftali, Director),
Miller Center of Public Affairs
- Original LBJ tapes courtesy of the Lyndon
B. Johnson Library
About the Authors:
David Coleman and Marc Selverstone are assistant professors at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs, where they are annotating and transcribing the secret White House recordings of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. They are co-editors, with Fredrik Logevall, of Prelude to Escalation: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Dilemmas of Vietnam (W.W. Norton, forthcoming).
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